Showing posts with label knowledge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label knowledge. Show all posts

Saturday, 12 September 2009

Can a taxonomy be true?

In a previous posting I argued that what distinguishes knowledge from mere opinion is that the arguments and evidence in its favour make it seem more likely than not to be true. It’s not necessary, because it’s generally not possible, to be sure that they are true.

This is fairly clear for the simple propositions considered by philosophers and for scientific theories but I’ve argued, in Types of model, that knowledge includes other things, such as taxonomies. But what does it mean for a taxonomy to be true?

The need for clarity
The first requirement is that the taxonomy is clearly defined. Specifically, that the definitions of the categories ensure that the people using the taxonomy can fairly readily agree on how to categorise a typical thing to which the taxonomy is supposed to apply.

The need for similarity
The second requirement is that things allocated to one category should be more similar to one another than they are to things in other categories. The similarity can apply to any property of interest. If I classify things on the basis of some property of interest to you then you will be able to locate them subsequently. This works for filing systems, library classification systems, classification systems for businesses, etc.

The best taxonomies pass the similarity test for many properties of the things in question and often work because of some underlying property of those things. The Periodic Table of the Elements is an excellent example. Elements in the same group have many similar physical and chemical properties because of similarities in the orbits of their electrons.

Testing for falsifiability
As Karl Popper showed it is, outside logic and maths, generally impossible to prove truth but often possible, and generally more useful, to try to prove a claim false. So can a taxonomy be proved false?

Indeed it can.

Consider the system of diagnoses used by psychiatrists. There are some differences between psychiatrists but most divide mental illnesses into neuroses and psychoses:
  • Neuroses are further divided into anxiety, depression, obsession and various phobias.
  • Psychoses are further divided into schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, paranoia, etc.
Richard Bentall, a professor of clinical psychology, has examined the evidence for this diagnostic approach in Madness Explained. He's shown that these conditions are not met. Psychiatrists do not agree on diagnoses and diagnoses are poor guides to treatment or outcomes. Research also shows that doctors can get better guidance on treatment by considering symptoms alone and ignoring diagnostic labels.

These findings, which are not particularly new, have profound implications for psychiatry. It has been going down a blind alley for over 100 years!

It’s also significant for my model of knowledge since it shows that a taxonomy can be seen as an hypothesis that meets Popper’s test of falsifiability. So a taxonomy is a form of knowledge.

Friday, 18 January 2008

Why knowledge is NOT “justified true belief”

In Theaetetus, Plato’s Socrates argues that knowledge is “justified true belief”. That is, it is, a belief for which the believer has a justification and that is, in fact, true (see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology). This doesn’t really work.

Firstly defining knowledge as belief excludes tacit knowledge, such knowing how to ride a bicycle. My ability to ride a bicycle does not depend upon my having any particular beliefs about riding or, indeed, bicycles. So Socrates’ definition can only apply to explicit knowledge.

To see why it doesn’t even work for explicit knowledge consider the following truth table for beliefs.

1

2

3

4

Is the belief justified?

Y

Y

N

N

Is the belief true?

Y

N

Y

N

Does it meet Socrates’ definition?

Y

N

N

N

Justification: I agree with Socrates in wanting to distinguish knowledge from mere guesswork. To count as knowledge a belief needs to be justified. Suppose you believe that Hungary is an attractive market for your latest product. This is a justified belief if you can produce evidence for it. I would accept market research and the success of similar products as sufficient evidence so if you have that data I’ll accept your belief as justified. I’m prepared to agree that a belief is justified even if the evidence is not conclusive, as it won’t be in this case until you’ve tried to sell it in Hungary.

Truth: The problem comes in distinguishing cases 1 and 2 in the table. Is your belief about the Hungarian market true? The only way that I can know this is to wait for the results of your Hungarian launch. And if you never launch your product in Hungary then neither of us will ever know if your belief was true – and therefore knowledge. This is inconvenient but not absurd.

How about the market research? Is that knowledge, ie is the data you have accurate and appropriate? You believe so and you have reasons for doing so, eg that you used a reputable firm with experience of the Hungarian market. You certainly have a justified belief. But can you know that it’s true? You cannot be certain, so this, also, does not meet Socrates’ definition of knowledge.

Not truth but confidence

The reality here is that beliefs can be held varying degrees of confidence. We can rarely be certain but are often, justifiably, confident. And we determine the proper degree of confidence using just those arguments that constitute the justification for the belief.

So knowledge, I suggest, is those beliefs where the arguments and evidence in favour make them seem more likely than not. Beliefs where the arguments and evidence in favour fall short of that are rumours, opinions or prejudices.

This view has two immediate consequences:

  • In applying knowledge we should consider how sure we are of its truth. We should not claim certainty where the evidence is doubtful.
  • Systems that store knowledge should include assessments of reliability and/or pointers to the sources of the supposed knowledge.

Thursday, 17 January 2008

Types of model

In The Starting Point, my first post on this blog, I argued that “(B) Much knowledge can be seen as … models.” That’s obvious to some degree but it raises the question of what constitutes a model.

There are at least four kinds of model: Structural, taxonomic, developmental and causal. There are also metamodels.

In The Starting Point I argued that “(A) Knowledge is most interesting and important where it is general.” Some models are very general. Thus most fundamental models in physics can apply anywhere in the universe. Some are entirely specific, eg the UK Treasury’s model of the UK economy applies only to the UK and probably for only a few years. For now I only note this distinction. It may be desirable to formalise it at some future point.

Structural models

Structural models show the structure of an actual or proposed object. They may be physical or virtual. Structural models are used in many areas including medicine, chemistry and the various kinds of engineering.

Doctors have created generic models of the body’s skeleton, nerves, blood vessels, etc. which are used in medical education and to guide surgery. In sensitive cases exploratory operations and non-invasive scans (using X-rays, ultrasound or MRI) are used to create models of an individual patient’s body. Another recent advance has been the construction of full-size

Chemists have long used structural models of molecules to help them reason about their properties and reactions. For many years they were drawn on paper or built using rods and balls but now they are increasingly likely to be electronic. Electronic models allow calculation of, eg, molecular shapes.

Engineers used to rely on drawings to communicate their designs to clients and those who have to build them. They increasingly use 3D models which also support design work and construction. During design they enable stress calculations, simulation of performance, compatibility, etc. They may generate lists of required materials, work allocations and control data for numerically-controlled tools.

Taxonomic models

A taxonomic model is a set of categories with allocation rules. These rules are usually text for use by a human classifier but may be executable. Thus, in 1999 the BBC automated the allocation of incoming news reports to its own 5,000 news categories. Journalists use these categories to select the reports they need. The system, News On-line (NEON), replaced the people who had previously done this job.

Some taxonomies are very simple. For instance, the states of matter are solid, liquid, gas and plasma. These are often stable.

Others are very large and may evolve continuously. Well-known large-scale taxonomies include:

  • In science, the Periodic Table of the Chemical elements and the Linnaean taxonomy of living things.
  • In business, Standard Industry codes (SIC), the UN Product Classification, the Yellow pages categories.
  • In marketing, the Mosaic set of consumer profiles.
  • In information retrieval, the Dewey decimal system and the Yahoo ontology.

We sometimes find that a causal model underlies a taxonomy, eg, blood groups. Sometimes this is known first; sometimes only later. Thus:

  • The distinctness of the chemical elements reflects the quantum mechanics of atomic nuclei.
  • The Linnaean taxonomy reflects the evolution of living things – a phenomenon that was not understood in Linnaeus’ time.
  • The Mosaic profiles reflect people’s lifestyle choices and resources

This also applies to sub-atomic particles and blood groups but not (so far) to genres or Standard Industry codes (SIC), the Dewey decimal system or the Yahoo ontology.

Developmental models

A developmental model asserts that its subject, eg an organism or a market, must pass through a series of stages. There are many stages models. Amongst the best-known are those developed by Piaget in the area of child development.

A well-known business example is Geoffrey Moore’s market development model:

  • Innovators
  • Early adopters
  • Chasm
  • Early Majority
  • Late Majority
  • Laggards

(See Crossing the chasm by Geoffrey Moore).

Like a taxonomy a developmental model may be based on a causal model or may be purely empirical.

Causal models

Causal models show how events lead to consequences.

The most basic causal models are purely indicative – little more than a list of factors that predispose to a result.

At the next step up are empirical models. These models produce forecasts by extrapolating from previous experience. Many economic and financial planning models are of this kind.

The best causal models are mathematical and allow quantitative prediction of consequences. They may be tacit or explicit. Tacit causal models may be no more than correlations. Explicit causal models, eg Newtonian mechanics, include explanations.

Some models are hybrid. Typically they use theory-based formulae where they are available and empirical formulae elsewhere. The Dupuy Insitute's Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (see separate posting) appears to be a hybrid.

A causal model requires a taxonomy as foundation. That is, the entities in the model must be clearly defined. Sometimes the taxonomy predates the causal model but some causal models, probably including the most significant ones, require some revision of the taxonomy.

Metamodels

A metamodel is a general model that says, for one or more specific models, which features are significant and, sometimes, how they are represented.

Suppose a database contains a digital model of a gearbox. Underlying the database is a schema, an executable digital listing of the kinds of data items and relationships used to store that model. This schema is the metamodel for the gearbox model and would be equally applicable to other gearboxes and, probably, to a wide range of engineered structures.

In principle there are metametamodels – but these are only needed by, for instance, people designing new database and knowledge management systems.

Saturday, 29 December 2007

The starting point

I've been thinking about knowledge and knowledge management intermittently for over ten years. As a computer and management consultant I started from the need to manage information and knowledge in organisations and from Peter Drucker's insight that 'knowledge work' was becoming central to the economy.

I believe there's a disconnect between the two. By knowledge work Drucker meant, roughly, work done by people with formal education at or above degree level. But most of what's written about 'knowledge management' (KM) has nothing to say about the kind of knowledge that is learnt in gaining a degree. I don't say that the KM literature is worthless - only that it's incomplete in an important respect.

My own thinking started from a definition and two propositions.

My definition

Knowledge is assertions that are based on evidence. Assertions don't become knowledge because they are widely believed or found in textbooks (or holy books) or endorsed by authority (whether political, organisational or religious) but because they are supported by logic and observation.

Notice that this is NOT the same as defining knowledge as "justified true belief". Truth is not part of my definition because it cannot be definitively known.

Scientific knowledge is the form of knowledge that most clearly exemplifies my definition and it's reasonable to seek illumination from the philosophy and practice of science. There is, of course, knowledge in other areas, eg history, marketing and business management.

Of course my definition begs the question as to how much evidence is needed to to convert an assertion into knowledge. I confess that I do not (yet) have an answer to this question of which I'm confident. My best current answer is to replace the opinion/knowledge dichotomy with a scale which has prejudice at one end and established knowledge at the other. This would be consistent with Russell's advice to 'give to each proposition that degree of belief justified by the evidence'.

Two propositions

A) Knowledge is most interesting and important where it is general. Thus Newton's laws of motion are more important than the orbital parameters of any one planet. And an effective customer segmentation scheme is more important than any one customer's spending pattern.

B) Much knowledge can be seen as a model of the domain concerned. Newton's laws of motion are a mathematical model and a great deal of science can be seen as models of various kinds.

Models, generally less precise and mathematical, are also common in management science and marketing.

Some knowledge, and this is especially true of tacit knowledge, is probably not models; it's certainly not explicit models. I'll return to this point in subsequent posts.

Implications
The processes of knowledge creation and verification are important parts of knowledge management. It's useful to see them as model building and testing.