Showing posts with label truth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label truth. Show all posts

Saturday, 12 September 2009

Can a taxonomy be true?

In a previous posting I argued that what distinguishes knowledge from mere opinion is that the arguments and evidence in its favour make it seem more likely than not to be true. It’s not necessary, because it’s generally not possible, to be sure that they are true.

This is fairly clear for the simple propositions considered by philosophers and for scientific theories but I’ve argued, in Types of model, that knowledge includes other things, such as taxonomies. But what does it mean for a taxonomy to be true?

The need for clarity
The first requirement is that the taxonomy is clearly defined. Specifically, that the definitions of the categories ensure that the people using the taxonomy can fairly readily agree on how to categorise a typical thing to which the taxonomy is supposed to apply.

The need for similarity
The second requirement is that things allocated to one category should be more similar to one another than they are to things in other categories. The similarity can apply to any property of interest. If I classify things on the basis of some property of interest to you then you will be able to locate them subsequently. This works for filing systems, library classification systems, classification systems for businesses, etc.

The best taxonomies pass the similarity test for many properties of the things in question and often work because of some underlying property of those things. The Periodic Table of the Elements is an excellent example. Elements in the same group have many similar physical and chemical properties because of similarities in the orbits of their electrons.

Testing for falsifiability
As Karl Popper showed it is, outside logic and maths, generally impossible to prove truth but often possible, and generally more useful, to try to prove a claim false. So can a taxonomy be proved false?

Indeed it can.

Consider the system of diagnoses used by psychiatrists. There are some differences between psychiatrists but most divide mental illnesses into neuroses and psychoses:
  • Neuroses are further divided into anxiety, depression, obsession and various phobias.
  • Psychoses are further divided into schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, paranoia, etc.
Richard Bentall, a professor of clinical psychology, has examined the evidence for this diagnostic approach in Madness Explained. He's shown that these conditions are not met. Psychiatrists do not agree on diagnoses and diagnoses are poor guides to treatment or outcomes. Research also shows that doctors can get better guidance on treatment by considering symptoms alone and ignoring diagnostic labels.

These findings, which are not particularly new, have profound implications for psychiatry. It has been going down a blind alley for over 100 years!

It’s also significant for my model of knowledge since it shows that a taxonomy can be seen as an hypothesis that meets Popper’s test of falsifiability. So a taxonomy is a form of knowledge.

Friday, 18 January 2008

Why knowledge is NOT “justified true belief”

In Theaetetus, Plato’s Socrates argues that knowledge is “justified true belief”. That is, it is, a belief for which the believer has a justification and that is, in fact, true (see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology). This doesn’t really work.

Firstly defining knowledge as belief excludes tacit knowledge, such knowing how to ride a bicycle. My ability to ride a bicycle does not depend upon my having any particular beliefs about riding or, indeed, bicycles. So Socrates’ definition can only apply to explicit knowledge.

To see why it doesn’t even work for explicit knowledge consider the following truth table for beliefs.

1

2

3

4

Is the belief justified?

Y

Y

N

N

Is the belief true?

Y

N

Y

N

Does it meet Socrates’ definition?

Y

N

N

N

Justification: I agree with Socrates in wanting to distinguish knowledge from mere guesswork. To count as knowledge a belief needs to be justified. Suppose you believe that Hungary is an attractive market for your latest product. This is a justified belief if you can produce evidence for it. I would accept market research and the success of similar products as sufficient evidence so if you have that data I’ll accept your belief as justified. I’m prepared to agree that a belief is justified even if the evidence is not conclusive, as it won’t be in this case until you’ve tried to sell it in Hungary.

Truth: The problem comes in distinguishing cases 1 and 2 in the table. Is your belief about the Hungarian market true? The only way that I can know this is to wait for the results of your Hungarian launch. And if you never launch your product in Hungary then neither of us will ever know if your belief was true – and therefore knowledge. This is inconvenient but not absurd.

How about the market research? Is that knowledge, ie is the data you have accurate and appropriate? You believe so and you have reasons for doing so, eg that you used a reputable firm with experience of the Hungarian market. You certainly have a justified belief. But can you know that it’s true? You cannot be certain, so this, also, does not meet Socrates’ definition of knowledge.

Not truth but confidence

The reality here is that beliefs can be held varying degrees of confidence. We can rarely be certain but are often, justifiably, confident. And we determine the proper degree of confidence using just those arguments that constitute the justification for the belief.

So knowledge, I suggest, is those beliefs where the arguments and evidence in favour make them seem more likely than not. Beliefs where the arguments and evidence in favour fall short of that are rumours, opinions or prejudices.

This view has two immediate consequences:

  • In applying knowledge we should consider how sure we are of its truth. We should not claim certainty where the evidence is doubtful.
  • Systems that store knowledge should include assessments of reliability and/or pointers to the sources of the supposed knowledge.